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ABSTRACT
Motion sensors such as accelerometers and gyroscopes measure
the instant acceleration and rotation of a device, in three dimen-
sions. Raw data streams from motion sensors embedded in portable
and wearable devices may reveal private information about users
without their awareness. For example, motion data might disclose
the weight or gender of a user, or enable their re-identification. To
address this problem, we propose an on-device transformation of
sensor data to be shared for specific applications, such as moni-
toring selected daily activities, without revealing information that
enables user identification. We formulate the anonymization prob-
lem using an information-theoretic approach and propose a new
multi-objective loss function for training deep autoencoders. This
loss function helps minimizing user-identity information as well
as data distortion to preserve the application-specific utility. The
training process regulates the encoder to disregard user-identifiable
patterns and tunes the decoder to shape the output independently of
users in the training set. The trained autoencoder can be deployed
on a mobile or wearable device to anonymize sensor data even
for users who are not included in the training dataset. Data from
24 users transformed by the proposed anonymizing autoencoder
lead to a promising trade-off between utility and privacy, with an
accuracy for activity recognition above 92% and an accuracy for
user identification below 7%.
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Figure 1: The Anonymizer is a pre-trained autoencoder that
transforms raw data before they are shared with an (un-
trusted) app to enable a service-specific inference that does
not reveal private information about the user. KEY - Xs j :
raw data generated by sensor s at time j; X′s j : correspond-
ing anonymized data after transformation.
1 INTRODUCTION
Motion data from the sensors in mobile and wearable devices can
reveal private information about users without their awareness.
For instance, motion patterns can be used to create fine-grained
behavioral profiles of users that reveal their identity [23]. We are
interested in designing an on-device privacy-preserving approach
to share with apps transformed sensor data in order to prevent the
exposure of sensitive information unrelated to the service while
simultaneously preserving the service-specific utility (see Figure 1).
Approaches for privacy-preserving data release include differ-
entially private mechanisms [6] and information theoretic frame-
works [28]. Differential privacy [36] offers a privacy guarantee for
access to private datasets, but it is not applicable to continuously
released sensor data. In fact, a private mechanism for publishing
sensitive data needs to aggregate all users’ data [33] and, in our sce-
nario, we do not trust data aggregators. Moreover, we want to run
the mechanism on user devices, but the local version of differential
privacy [5, 16] is unsuitable in this case. Time series such as sensor
data present recurring patterns in consecutive temporal windows
and, unless considerable noise is added to each window that would
eliminate the utility of the data, applying the same differentially
private mechanism to all windows does not provide a privacy guar-
antee [32]. Instead, frameworks based on information theory [17]
consider as the measure of privacy the mutual information between
the released data and the latent information that can be inferred
from data. Under this framework we do not necessarily need to
design a noise addition mechanism and we can remove or at least
reduce private information while keeping useful service-specific
information [25].
To design a data release mechanism that simultaneously satisfies
utility and privacy constraints, we use adversarial approaches to
train deep autoencoders [19]. Using adversarial training [7, 34], we
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approximate the mutual information by estimating the posterior
distribution of private variables, given the released data. Moreover,
we anonymize data locally and define a mechanism that can be
shared across users, whereas existing solutions need a trusted party
to access user personal data to offer a reliable distortion mecha-
nism [16, 24, 37] or need users to participate in a privacy-preserving
training mechanism [1].
We formulate the sensor data anonymization problem as an op-
timization process based on information theory and propose a new
way of training deep autoencoders. Inspired by recent advances
in adversarial training to discover from raw data useful represen-
tations for a specific task [19], we propose a new multi-objective
loss function to train deep autoencoders [22]. The loss function
regulates the transformed data to keep as little information as pos-
sible about user identity, subject to a minimal distortion to preserve
utility, which in our case is that of an activity recognition service.
Unlike other approaches [10, 11, 20, 26, 28, 34], our training
process not only regulates the encoder to consider exclusively task-
specific features in the data, but also shapes the final output in-
dependently of the specific users in the training set. This process
leads to a generalized model that can be applied to new data of
unseen users, without user-specific re-training. We evaluate the effi-
ciency and utility-privacy trade-off of the proposed mechanism and
compare it with other methods on an activity recognition dataset1.
2 RELATEDWORK
Adversarial learning enables us to approximate, using generative
adversarial networks (GANs) [9], the underlying distribution of
data or to model, using variational autoencoders (VAE) [14], data
with well-known distributions. These techniques can be applied to
quantify mutual information for optimization problems [7, 11, 24,
34] and can be used to remove sensitive information from latent
low-dimensional representations of the data, e.g. removing text
from images [7]. An optimal privacy mechanism can be formulated
as a game between two players, a privatizer and an adversary, with
an iterative minimax algorithm [11]. Moreover, the service provider
can share a feature extractor based on an initial training set that is
then re-trained by the user on their data and then sent back to the
service provider [24, 30].
In our work, we do not assume the existence of a trusted data
aggregator to perform anonymization for end users. We assume
we only have access to a public dataset for training a general
anonymization model. The trained anonymizer should general-
ize to new unseen users, because it is impractical for all users to
provide their data for the training.
The feature maps of a convolutional autoencoder have the ability
to extract patterns and dependencies among data points and have
shown good performance in time series analysis [38]. Autoencoders
compress the input into a low-dimensional latent representation
and then reconstruct the input from this representation. Autoen-
coders are usually trained by minimizing the differences (e.g. mean
squared error or cross entropy) between the input and its recon-
struction [22]. The bottleneck of the autoencoder forces the training
process to capture the most descriptive patterns in the data (i.e. the
main factors of variation of the data) in order to generalize the
1Code and data are available at: https://github.com/mmalekzadeh/motion-sense
model and prevent undesirable memorization [2, 8]. An effective
way to train an autoencoder is to randomly corrupt [35] or re-
place [21] the original input and force the model to refine it in the
reconstruction. In this way, a well-trained autoencoder captures
prominent and desired patterns in the data and ignores noise or
undesired patterns [35]. Moreover, a latent representation can be
learned that removes some meaningful patterns from the data to
reduce the risk of inferring sensitive information [21].
Only considering the latent representation produced by the en-
coder and leaving intact the decoder with information extracted
from the training data offer only limited protection [7, 16]. Con-
sidering the decoder’s output leads to a more reliable data pro-
tection [20, 26]. In this paper, we consider outputs from both the
encoder and decoder of an autoencoder for data transformation.
We also consider a distance function as an adjustable constraint on
the transformed data to control the amount of data distortion and
help tune the privacy-utility trade-off for different applications.
3 SENSOR DATA ANONYMIZATION
We aim to produce a data transformation mechanism to anonymize
mobile sensor data so that the user specific motion patterns, that
are highly informative about user’s identity, cannot be captured by
an untrusted app that has access to the sensor to recognize a set of
B required activities. Thus, we consider users’ identity, that can be
inferred from user specific motion patterns, as their sensitive data.
We use the concept of mutual information to quantify how much
can be inferred about a particular variable from a data set. We wish
to minimize the amount the data changes but remove the ability to
infer private information from the data.2
3.1 Anonymization function
Let sensor component s (e.g. the z axis value of the gyroscope
sensor) at sampling instant j, generate Xs j ∈ R. Let the time series
generated byM sensor components in a time-window of lengthW ,
be represented by matrix X ∈ RM×W , with X = (Xs j ). Let N be
the number of users and U ∈ {0, 1}N be a variable representing the
identity of the user; a one-hot vector of length N , a vector with 1
in the k-th place and 0 in all other places if user k generated the
data being considered. Let the current activity that generates X be
T ∈ {0, 1}B ; a one-hot vector of length B with the one in position b
if the current activity is the b-th activity. Finally, we define the data
with the user’s identifiable information obscured as the anonymized
sensor data, X′.
Let I(·; ·) be the mutual information function, d(·, ·) a distance
function between two time series3, A(.) a data transformation func-
tion and X the data we want to anonymize. We define the fitness
function F(.) as
F
(
A (X)) = βi I (U; A (X)) − βa I (T; A (X)) + βdd (X,A (X)) , (1)
where the non-negative weight parameters βi , βa and βd determine
the trade-off between privacy and utility.
2As notation we use capital bold-face, e.g. X, for random variables (univariate or
multivariate) and lowercase bold-face, e.g. x, for an instantiation; roman typestyle, e.g.
I, for operations or functions; lowercase math font, e.g. i , for indexing; and capital
math font, e.g. M , for specific numbers such as the size of a vector.
3In the specific implementation of this paper, we choose as d(·, ·) the mean squared
error,MSE, between raw data and the corresponding transformed data. One can choose
any other distance functions based on the tasks at hand.
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Figure 2: The losses involved in the training procedure.
After training, the Anonymizing AutoEncoder (AAE), or
Anonymizer, runs on the device as interface between sen-
sor data and (untrusted) apps. KEY – Solid lines: data flow;
dashed lines: loss functions. X: raw input data; Y: low-
dimensional representation of the input data; X′: trans-
formed data; Li : identity loss; La : activity loss; Ld : distortion
loss function; L: overall loss function for training the AAE.
Let us define the anonymization function, A(·), as
A (X) = argmin
A(X)
F
(
A (X)) . (2)
such that the optimal A(·) transforms X into X′ = A(X), which
contain as little information as possible associated to the identity of
the user (minimum I(U;X′)), while maintaining sufficient informa-
tion to discriminate the activity (maximum I(T;X′)) andminimizing
the distortion of the original data (minimum d(X,X′)).
As we cannot practically search over all possible anonymization
functions, we consider a deep neural network and look for the opti-
mal parameter set through training. To approximate the required
mutual information terms, we reformulate the optimization prob-
lem in (1) as a neural network optimization problem and train an
anonymizing autoencoder (AAE) based on adversarial training.
3.2 Architecture
Let A(X;θ ) be an autoencoder neural network, where θ is the pa-
rameter set and X is the input vector to be transformed into the
output vector X′ with the same dimensions. The network optimizer
finds the optimal parameter set θ∗ by searching the space of all the
possible parameter sets, Θ, as:
θ∗ = argmin
θ ∈Θ
βi I
(
U; A
(
X;θ
) )−βa I (T; A (X;θ ) )+βdd (X,A (X;θ ) )
(3)
where, A(·;θ∗) is the optimal estimator for a general A(·) in (1).
We obtain θ∗ using backpropagation with stochastic gradient
descent and a multi-objective loss function. We also determine
values of βi , βa and βd as the trade-off between utility and privacy
through cross validation over the training dataset.
Figure 2 shows the framework for the training of the AAE. The
Encoder mapsX into an identity concealing low-dimensional latent
representation Y by getting feedback from a pre-trained classifier,
the Encoder Regularizer, which penalizes the Encoder if it cap-
tures information corresponding to U into Y. The Decoder outputs
a reconstruction of the input, X′, from the Y, and gets feedback
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Figure 3: Implementation of the models shown in Figure 2
for a dataset with 24 users and 4 activities. KEY – EncReg:
Encoder Regularizer; DecReg: Decoder Regularizer; ActReg:
Activity Regularizer.
from other pre-trained classifiers, the Decoder Regularizer and the
Activity Regularizer, respectively.
The Encoder Regularizer (EncReg) and the Activity Regularizer
(ActReg) share the same architecture as the Decoder Regularizer
(DecReg). The only differences are that the shape of input for EncReg
is 32, instead of 128, and the shape of softmax output for ActReg is
4, instead of 24 for a dataset with 24 users and 4 activities. Figure 3
shows the overall architecture whereas Figures 4 and 5 show the
details of each neural network model.
Because convolutional layers capture well locally autocorrelated
and translation-invariant patterns in time series [15], we choose
the two privacy regularizers, EncReg and DecReg, and the activity
regularizer, ActReg, to be convolutional neural network classifiers
trained by a categorical cross-entropy loss function [38].
3.3 Training
Instead of just training on a single epoch, as usually done in adver-
sarial training [9], all the classifiers should be trained for several
epochs, e , on the entire dataset to converge to suboptimal infor-
mation estimators for use in the next step. In fact, our objective is
not to learn the data distribution, but to transform data from an
identity-centred sample space (which is informative about users’
identity) to an activity-centred sample space (which carry only
information about the underlying activity). Therefore, each regu-
larizer should at least converge to a suboptimal approximator of
mutual information.
The EncReg learns to identify a user among N in the training
dataset by getting as input Y the low-dimensional representation
of X produced by the Encoder. The output is the identity label,
U. The DecReg learns to identify users by getting as input the
reconstructed data, X′, produced by the Decoder (here too the
output is the identity label, U). The ActReg learns to recognize the
current activity and gets the reconstructed data,X′, as input and the
activity label, T, as output. Finally, the distortion regularizer, a loss
function that constrains the allowed distortion on the data, gets the
original data, X, and reconstructed data, X′, to calculate pointwise
the mean squared error to quantify the amount of distortion.
After each iteration, we evaluate the convergence condition of
the AAE to decide, based on the current utility-privacy trade-off.
We discuss more about possible evaluation methods in Section 4.4.
Figure 6 summarizes the training of the AAE, which can be
done locally, on the user powerful devices; centrally, by a service
provider; or a user can download a public pre-trained model and
refined it on their own data [29].
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Figure 4: Implementation of the AAE architecture: Encoder
and Decoder models in Figure 3.
3.4 Multi-objective loss function
After each round of training of the regularizers, we freeze their
parameters while training the AAE (line 11 of the training pro-
cedure, Figure 6). A key contributior to the AAE training is our
proposed multi-objective loss function, L, which implements the
fitness function F
(
A (x)) of Eq. (1):
L = βiLi − βaLa + βdLd , (4)
where the regularization parameters βa , βd , and βi are non-negative,
real-valued weights that determine the utility-privacy trade-off. La
and Ld are utility losses that can be customized based on the app
requirements (note that Ld is the only available utility loss if there
is no target application), whereas Li is an identity loss that helps
the AAE remove user-specific signals.
The categorical cross-entropy loss function for classification, La ,
aims to preserve activity-specific patterns4:
La = T log(Tˆ), (5)
where T is the one-hot B-dimensional vector of the true activ-
ity label for X and Tˆ, the output of a softmax function, is a B-
dimensional vector of probabilities for the prediction of the activity
label.
To tune the desired privacy-utility trade-off, the distance function
that controls the amount of distortion, Ld , forces X′s j to be as
4We can customize La for the task e.g. using a binary cross-entropy for fall detec-
tion [18].
 Input Layer 
(2, 128, 1) 
(2, 128, 1) 
(2, 128, 32) 
Conv. Layer 
ReLU 
(2, 128, 32) (2, 64, 32) 
Max. Pooling 
Output Layer 
(24) 
Dropout ( 0.25) 
(2, 16, 32) 
(2, 16, 32) 
Conv. Layer 
ReLU 
(2, 16, 32) (2, 8, 32) 
Max. Pooling 
Dropout ( 0.25) 
…
 
(512) 
(128) 
Dense Layer 
ReLU 
(2, 8, 32) (512) 
Flatten 
Dropout ( 0.5) 
(128) 
(32) 
Dense Layer 
ReLU 
Dropout ( 0.5) 
(32) 
(24) 
Dense Layer 
SoftMax 
Figure 5: Implementation of the the DecReg architecture in
Figure 3 (we have the same structure for EncReg andActReg).
similar as possible to the input Xs j :
Ld =
1
M ×W
M∑
s=1
W∑
j=1
(Xs j − X′s j )2, (6)
Finally, the identity loss, Li , themost important term of ourmulti-
objective loss function that aims to minimize sensitive information
in the data, is defined as:
Li = −
(
U log
(
1N − Uˆ
)
+ log
(
1 −max
(
Uˆ
)))
, (7)
where 1N be the all-one column vector of length N , U is the true
identity label for X, and Uˆ is the output of the softmax function,
the N -dimensional vector of probabilities learned by the classifier
(i.e. the probability of each user label, given the input).
A trivial anonymization would consistently transform data of a
user into the data of another user (and vice versa). However, this
transformation would only satisfy the first element of Li . As no
attacker should be able to confidently predict U from X′, we maxi-
mize the difference between the prediction, Uˆ, and the true identity,
U by minimizing the cross-entropy between the true identity label
and the regularizer’s prediction of this label, as well as the max-
imum value of the predicted identity vector, Uˆ (see Eq. (7)). The
derivation of Li is presented in the next section.
4
1: procedure TrainAAE(X,U,T , e) ▷ X: dataset (M ×W temporal windows);U: identity labels; T : activity labels; e number of epochs.
2: AAE (Encoder+Decoder)← Random initialization;
3: AAE← Train on X as both input and output for e epochs;
4: Y ← Encoder(X); ▷ Y is the extracted latent representation from the raw data.
5: X′ ← CopyO f (X); ▷ Keep raw data intact to use it for evaluation in each iteration.
6: EncReg, DecReg, ActReg, AAE← Random initialization;
7: do
8: EncReg ← Train on Y as input andU as output using categorical cross-entropy as loss function, for e epochs;
9: DecReg ← Train on X′ as input andU as output using categorical cross-entropy as loss function, for e epochs;
10: ActReg ← Train on X′ as input and T as output using categorical cross-entropy as loss function, for e epochs;
11: Freeze parameters of EncReg, DecReg, and ActReg;
12: AAE← Train on X′ as input andU,U, T , and X as outputs for e epochs (see Figure 2);
13: Y ← Encoder(X);
14: X′ ← Decoder(Y);
15: Unfreeze parameters of EncReg, DecReg, and ActReg;
16: while it does not satisfies the convergence conditions;
17: return AAE; ▷ Resulting AAE to be used as Anonymizer.
Figure 6: The adversarial regularization procedure to train the Anonymizer, A(·,θ∗), using Eq. (3)
3.5 Derivation of the identity loss
Our goal is to makeU andX′ independent of each other. To this end,
we minimize the amount of information leakage from U to X′ [25].
As a function f that aims to infer the identity of a user does not
increase the available information, the following inequality holds:
I(U;X′) ≥ I(U; f(X′)), (8)
and therefore if we reduce the mutual information between the
user’s identity and their released data, the processing of these data
cannot increase the mutual information. The mutual information,
I(U;X′), can be defined as
I(U;X′) = H(U) − H(U|X′), (9)
where H(·) is the entropy. As the entropy is non-negative and we
cannot controlH(U), we maximize the conditional entropy between
identity variable and the transformed data, H(U|X′), in order to
minimize the mutual information, I(U;X′):
H(U|X′) = H(U,X′) − H(X′). (10)
The entropy of X′, H(X′), can be reduced independently of any
other latent variables by simply downsampling the data. However,
as blindly minimizing H(X′) could lead to a substantial utility loss,
we focus on maximizing H(U,X′).
Let p(U,X′) be the joint distribution of U and X′; and Su and SX′
be the supports of U and X′, respectively. Then
H(U,X′) = −
∫
Su
∫
SX′
p(U,X′) logp(U,X′). (11)
We now need an estimator for H(U,X′) as we cannot calculate
the joint entropy directly for high-dimensional data. When labeled
data are available, X′ can be used as input to predict Uˆ as an esti-
mation of U. We therefore reformulate the problem of maximizing
the joint entropy, H(U,X′), as maximization of the cross entropy
between the true label, U, and the predicted label, Uˆ:
HUˆ(U) = −
∫
SX′
U log Uˆ. (12)
If Uˆ[k] is the k-th element of the vector predicted by the mul-
ticlass classifier, the empirical cross entropy for data X′ of user k
is:
− U log Uˆ = − log Uˆ[k] (13)
and, since Uˆ[k] ∈ [0, 1], maximizing − log Uˆ[k] is equivalent to
minimizing − log (1 − Uˆ[k]). Therefore minimizing the first term of
Eq. (7), U log(1N − Uˆ), minimizes the mutual information, I(U;X′),
and, by forcing the AAE to minimize this value, we minimize the
amount of user-identifiable information in X′.
3.6 Examples
To gain an appreciation of the type of distortions introduced by the
AAE, we compare sensor data before and after transformation.
Figure 7 (top) shows the low-dimensional latent representation
of raw gyroscope data extracted by the bottleneck of the model.
The distribution of Y has useful information to distinguish not
only the activities, but also the users (color clusters of the top-right
plot). Figure 7 (bottom) shows the latent representation of the data
anonymized by our method: the transformation masks the data for
different users but preserves the Jogging activity samples separated
from those of the other activities (note that this is a considerably
compressed representation of the input data).
Figure 8 compares raw and transformed data of four activities.
It is possible to notice that the AAE obscures patterns and peaks,
but maintains differences among data of different activities.
Finally, Figure 9 compares the spectrogram of raw and trans-
formed data for a user: the AAE introduces new periodic compo-
nents and obscure some of the original ones, and they differ across
the activities. As periodic components in accelerometer data can
disclose information about attributes of users such as height and
5
Figure 7: Latent representation, Y, of the 64D gyroscope data
in 2D. (Top row): raw data. (Bottom row): data transformed
by the AAE. (Left column): samples of four activities. (Right
column): Jogging data for all users.
Figure 8: Comparison of raw (first and third row) and trans-
formed data (second and fourth row) for gyroscope (first two
rows) and accelerometer (last two rows) for four activities.
weight, the AAE reduces the possibility of user re-identification by
introducing new periodic components in the data.
In the next section we quantify the performance of the proposed
method and compare it with alternative approaches.
4 EVALUATION
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed data anonymizer, we
analyze the trade-off between recognizing the activity of a user and
concealing their identity. We measure the extent to which the activ-
ity recognition accuracy is reduced by the anonymization process,
compared to using the raw data. We compare with two baseline
Figure 9: Spectrogram of raw (first and third row) and trans-
formed data (second and fourth row) for gyroscope (first two
rows) and accelerometer (last two rows) for four activities.
methods for coarse-grained time series data, namely Resampling
and Singular Spectrum Analysis (SSA), and with REP [7], which only
considers sensitive information included in Y and does not take X′
into account (Figure 2).
4.1 Experimental Setup
Current public datasets of motion sensor data do not simultaneously
satisfy the requirements of abundance and variety of activities and
users5. We therefore collected a dataset from the accelerometer and
gyroscope of an iPhone 6s placed in the user’s front pocket of tight
trousers [13, 20]. The dataset includes 24 participants, in a range of
age, weight, height and gender, who performed 6 activities in 15
trials. In each trial, we used the same environment and conditions
for all the users (see Table 1). We divide the dataset into training
and test sets with two different strategies, namely Subject and Trial.
In Subject, we use as test data all the data of 4 users, 2 females and
2 males, and as training data that of the remaining 20 users. After
training, the model is evaluated on data of 20 unseen users. In Trial,
we use as test data one trial session for each user and as training
data the remaining trial sessions (for example, one trial of Walking
of each user is used as test and the other two trials are used as
training). In both cases, we put 20% of training data for validation
during the training phase. We repeat each experiment 5 times and
report the mean and the standard deviation. For all the experiments
we use the magnitude value for both gyroscope and accelerometer.
We choose as window lengthW = 128 (2.56 seconds) and we set
as stride S = 10. For all the regularizers, EncReg, DecReg, and ActReg,
we use 2D convolutional neural networks. To prevent overfitting to
5Datasets that satisfy both (e.g. [23]) are still private.
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Number of users 24 (14 males, 10 females)
Sampling rate 50 Hz
Sensors
gyroscope
accelerometer
Features
rotationRate (x,y,z)
userAcceleration (x,y,z)
gravity (x,y,z)
attitude(roll, pitch, yaw)
Activities
(number of trials)
Downstairs (3 trials )
Upstairs (3 trials)
Walking (3 trials)
Jogging (2 trials)
Sat (2 trials)
Stand-Up (2 trials)
Table 1: TheMotionSense dataset [20]. Multiple trials of the
same activity are performed in different locations. KEY – (x,
y, z): the three axes of the sensor.
the training data, we put a Dropout [31] layer after each convolution
layer. We also use an L2 regularization to penalize large weights so
that the classifier is forced to learn features that are more relevant
for the prediction.
4.2 Sensor Data Characteristics
In this section we discuss the characteristics of motion sensor data
that informed the design of our sensor data anonymizer.
Figure 10 shows the correlation between the magnitude of the
time series collected from these sensors. We see that both sensors
almost follow each other, especially for the peaks and periodicity
of the magnitude value, whereas a correlation among axes is less
obvious. Figure 11 compares the magnitude values of the data from
two sensors when the user performs in six different activities. Note
that Sat and Stand-Up are difficult to be told apart. The only data that
are informative to distinguish these activities from each other are
the values of the gravity axes which determine whether the phone
is held vertically or horizontally. However, we do not consider Sat
and Stand-Up in our experiments for training the AAE.
Figure 12 compares the F1 score obtained using as classifier a
deep convolutional neural network with seven groups of data6. We
use the Subject setting for activity recognition and the Trial setting
for identity recognition. The groups of data are the magnitude value
of each sensor, the exact value of each axis, the data of only one of
these sensors and then both. It is interesting to estimate the amount
of information about user’s identity that can be extracted form the
correlation between accelerometer and gyroscope. Note that we
can achieve equal (or better) accuracy for activity recognition using
6By the similar architecture described in Figure 5
Figure 10: Sample accelerometer (top) and gyroscope (bot-
tom) data for Walking of a specific user. KEY – RPS: revolu-
tions per second,m/s2: metres per second squared
Figure 11: Sample accelerometer (accl) and gyroscope (gyro)
data for six activities for a single user.
only the magnitude, whereas we should use the values of each axis
for identity recognition. Moreover, using a 2D convolutional filter
(i.e. the classifier considers the correlation among the input sensors)
improves over both activity and identity recognition compared to
using 1D filters, which process each input separately. Hence, a
good anonymization mechanism should consider both inter-sensor
and intra-sensor correlations. We will use the magnitude value of
both gyro and accelerometer (MaдBoth_2D) in our experiments of
evaluating the utility-privacy trade-offs.
Figure 13 shows the autocorrelation at varying time lags for the
magnitude of accelerometer data for different activities (average
over 45 seconds of data for all users). Note that each activity has
a different period. Walking has the highest correlation, followed
by Jogging, Upstairs, and Downstairs. The distance between two
peaks can be related to the stride. There are also strong correlations
among samples inside a 2-second window, whereas correlations go
under the confidence interval after about 5 seconds.
Figure 14 shows the autocorrelations of the same activity per-
formed by three users. The heavier the user, the longer the intervals
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Figure 12: Average F1 score for the recognition, with differ-
ent sensor data types, of activity (top) and identity (bottom).
The black vertical segments show the standard deviation.
KEY – Mag: magnitude; gyro: gyroscope; accl: accelerome-
ter; Both: both gyro and accl; 1D and 2D are the dimensions
of the convolution filter.
Figure 13: Autocorrelation of accelerometer data for four ac-
tivities averaged over all the users. Correlation values out-
side the lines of the confidence interval (Conf. Int.) are sta-
tistically significant.
between two peaks (user u_1 is the heaviest among the three). This
user-identifiable pattern is a challenging feature to obscure before
sharing the data. In fact, we see that baseline methods like down-
sampling cannot hide the user identity.
4.3 Baseline Methods
As baseline methods we use Resampling and Singular Spectrum
Analysis.
Resampling ideally aims to reduce the richness of the data to
the extent that it contains useful information for recognizing the
activity but not identity-specific patterns. We choose a resampling
based on the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) and, specifically, we use
Figure 14: Autocorrelation of the accelerometer data for
Walking for three users. KEY – Conf.Int.: confidence inter-
val; u1, u13, u19: data of user 1, 13, and 19.
Figure 15: Classification accuracy for a deep convolutional
neural network for both Activity and Identity recognition.
(Left) Using data resampled to another rate (from 5 to 50 Hz,
where 50Hz is the original sampling rate). (Right)Using data
reconstructed using only a subset of components (from 1 to
10, from a total of 50), ordered from largest to smallest by
corresponding singular values.
the “signal.resample” function of “SciPy” package [12]. Figure 15
(left plot) shows the classification accuracy with downsampled sen-
sor data. For a fair comparison, we trained a fixed model (in terms
of the size of the parameters and number of the layers) for all the
sample rates. The impact of downsampling on activity recognition
can be ignored for a rates greater than 20Hz. However, even at
5Hz, we can distinguish the 24 users from each other with over 60%
accuracy.
Singular Spectrum Analysis (SSA) [3] decomposes time series into
interpretable components such as trend, period, and structureless
(or noise) components. The window length parameter specifies the
number of components. We decompose each X, into a set of D
components, {X1,X2, . . . ,XD }, such that the original time series
can be recovered as:
X =
D∑
d=1
Xd . (14)
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info. result
raw
(50Hz)
resample
(10Hz)
resample
(5Hz)
SSA
(1,2)
SSA
(1)
REP [7]
(50Hz)
AAE
(50Hz)
ACT
mean F1 92.51 91.11 88.02 88.59 87.41 91.47 92.91
var F1 2.06 0.63 1.85 0.91 0.89 00.87 0.37
ID
mean ACC 96.20 31.08 13.53 34.13 16.07 15.92 6.98
mean F1 95.90 25.57 8.86 28.59 12.58 11.25 1.76
DTW
mean Rank 0 7.2 9.3 6.8 9.5 10.7 6.6
var Rank 0 5.7 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.5 4.7
Table 2: Trade-off between utility (activity recognition) and privacy (identity recognition). KEY – ACT: activity recognition,
ID: identity recognition, ACC: accuracy, F1: F1 score, DTW: Dynamic Time Warping as the similarity measure, SSA: Singular
Spectrum Analysis, REP: Only Anonymizing the latent Representation, AAE: Our Anonymizing AutoEncoder. The forth row
shows the K-NN rank between 24 users.
As SSA arranges the elements Xd in descending order according
to their corresponding singular value, we explore the idea of in-
cremental reconstruction. Figure 15 (right plot) shows that training
a classifier on the reconstruction with only the first components,
up to the total of 10 extracted components, can achieve over 80%
accuracy for both activity and identity recognition.
4.4 Discussion
In this section, we compare the transformed data produced by our
trained AAE with the outputs of the other methods.
We train an activity recognition classifier on both the raw data
and the transformed data, and then use it for inference on the
corresponding test data. Here we use the Subject setting, thus the
test data includes data of new unseen users. The second row of
Table 2 shows that the average accuracy for activity recognition for
both Raw and AAE data is around 92%. Compared to other methods
that decrease the utility of the data, we can preserve the utility
and even slightly improve it, on average, as the AAE shapes data
such that an activity recognition classifier can learn better from the
transformed data than from the raw data.
To evaluate the degree of anonymity, we assume that an adver-
sary has access to the training dataset and we measure the ability of
a pre-trained deep classifier on users raw data in inferring the iden-
tity of the users when it receives the transformed data. We train a
classifier in the Trial setting over raw data and then feed it different
types of transformed data. The third row of Table 2 shows that
downsampling data from 50Hz to 5Hz reveals more information
than using the AAE output in the original frequency. These results
show that the AAE can effectively obscure user-identifiable infor-
mation so that even a model that have had access to users’ original
data cannot distinguish them after applying the transformation.
Finally, to evaluate the efficiency of the anonymization with
another unsupervised mechanism, we implement the k-Nearest
Neighbors (k-NN) with Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [27]. Using
DTW, we measure the similarity between the transformed data
of a target user k and the raw data of each user l , Xl , for all l ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,k, . . . ,N }. Then we use this similarity measure to find
the nearest neighbors of user l and check the rank of k among
them. The last row of Table 2 shows that it is very difficult to find
similarities between the transformed and raw data of the users as
the performance of the AAE is very similar to the baseline methods
and the constraint in Eq. (3) maintain the data as similar as possible
to the original data.
5 CONCLUSION
We proposed a multi-objective loss function to train an anonymiz-
ing autoencoder (AAE) as sensor data anonymizer for personal and
wearable devices. To remove user-identifiable features included in
the data we consider not only the feature extractor of the neural
network model (encoder), but we also force the reconstructor (de-
coder) to shape the final output independently of each user in the
training set, so the final trained model is a generalized model that
can be used by a new unseen user. We ensure that the transformed
data is minimally perturbed so an app can still produce accurate
results, for example for activity recognition. The proposed solution
is important to ensure anonymization for participatory sensing [4],
when individuals contribute data recorded by their personal devices
for health and well-being data analysis.
As future work, we aim to measure the cost of running such
local transformations on user devices; to conduct experiments on
other use cases (i.e. different tasks); and to derive statistical bounds
for the level of privacy protection achieved.
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